TOP SECRET

1

99

109

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
THE UNDER SECRETARY
S/P
REVIEWED BY WOLF JR DATE 5/25/82
RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S) January 29, 1948
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED☒ RELEASABLE☒
RELEASE DENIED☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

R

U - Mr. Lovett

I have studied carefully Rusk's memorandum of January 26 concerning the Policy Planning Staff paper on Palestine. I enclose a memorandum answering in detail the points he has raised. I hope this may be considered as a supplement to the earlier Staff paper.

As far as any technical inadequacy of the Planning Staff paper is concerned, I will of course bear in mind the suggestions you made, and see that they are taken into account in any future Staff papers. In the present instance we did not make the paper longer and more detailed because it was presented for approval as an initial Department position in the National Security Council, and we thought it would be most useful to stick to the main considerations of national interest involved.

But there is another aspect of this matter which causes me concern, and that is the question of basic policy. // Everything in Rusk's memorandum seems to me to point toward a line of policy designed to gain for us some relief from the difficulties of our present position, but to do this at the expense of our relations with the British and Arabs and at the cost of further involvement in commitments leading toward international enforcement of the Palestine decision.

I have deep misgivings about such a policy. Even if our relations with the British and the Arabs were expendable for such a purpose (which I would not concede), the respite we would gain would be of brief duration. The pressure we are under in this matter is such that, if we continued to temporize with it, it would not stop short of a point where we would finally hold major military and economic responsibility for the indefinite maintenance by armed force of a status quo in Palestine fiercely resented by the bulk of the Arab world. I do not believe that the U.S. public would ever tolerate such a situation. If I am correct in this analysis, that means that we will be obliged to draw the line, sooner or later, somewhere short of that point, against further commitments in this

TOP SECRET

direction. I believe that the sooner and the more sharply that line is drawn, the less trouble it will mean for this Government, for the United Nations, and probably for the people of Palestine.//

I think, therefore, that we have here a clear-cut issue of policy, which will have to be resolved promptly.

George F. Kennan
George F. Kennan